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Development in the era of climate change: 
How an interdisciplinary perspective illuminates the road 
ahead 
 
 
Walden Bello
*
 
 
 
I have been asked to speak on the relevance of an interdisciplinary approach to the question of 
climate change. The way I would like to approach this issue is to first discuss two topics 
extensively. The first is the role of China in global climate politics. The second is the implication of 
the current global economic downturn for climate policy. I will then draw out some of the 
implications of these two related topics for an interdisciplinary approach.
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China and Global Climate Politics 
Even as we in the developing world have become more and more intensely engaged in policy 
debates on climate change, the discussion and debate at the global level has become very 
complex and bitter. The prime illustration of this is, of course, the collapse of the Copenhagen 
meeting on climate change. This failure has been billed in some quarters as the “Seattle” of the 
climate front. Unlike Seattle, however, this was a debacle the world could not afford to have. 
 In the western press, China has been identified as the main reason the Copenhagen 
conference failed because it opposed the listing of emissions targets at a meeting of a group of 
countries led by President Barack Obama. The real story was more complex. What the press 
failed to mention was that this meeting was one of several unofficial meetings with a small 
number of countries that Obama had called, apparently with the support of Denmark, in order to 
impose a deal on the climate conference. In fact, drafting a declaration would have been in 
violation of an agreed-on conference process. 
Where China went wrong was not so much in opposing the listing of the emission 
numbers but in originally agreeing to attend these covert caucuses where Obama and a small 
group of other heads of state sought to unilaterally draft a declaration. China undoubtedly knew 
that these meetings—which included the leaders of selected northern countries as well as those 
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of Brazil, South Africa, and India—undermined the United Nations’ (UN) process. In the days 
leading up to Copenhagen, China had heard its allies in the developing world expose and 
denounce a covert effort by Denmark to convoke a parallel conference of over 20 countries to 
push through an unauthorized “Danish text” that advanced a climate agenda favored by the 
developed countries.  
It is perhaps not coincidental that most of the countries invited by Denmark were 
participants in the “Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate” first called by President 
George W. Bush, and re-launched before the Copenhagen meeting by President Obama, 
allegedly to “facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and developing economies.”  
The real aim of both the Major Economies Forum and the Danish parallel conference was, in the 
opinion of some Southern observers, to drive a wedge between the more advanced developing 
countries and the poorer, least developed, and most vulnerable countries.   
Having joined the covert Obama caucuses, China probably realized that it could not lend 
too much legitimacy to a declaration that issued from them since this would anger the majority of 
developing countries excluded from the meetings. The meetings, which resembled the notorious 
“Green Room” get-togethers of the heavy hitters of international trade during the ministerial 
conferences of the World Trade Organization, were not universally respected. This backtracking 
probably explains Prime Minister Wen Jia Bao’s absence from the caucus intended to finalize the 
declaration and his replacement by a relatively low-ranking official.  China blocked the 
declaration of voluntary emissions reduction figures—designed to give the big climate polluters 
the veneer of global responsibility without any significant obligations—likely because it did not 
want to give too much prominence to a document drafted at the margins of the conference.   
By attending the caucuses and participating in the drafting of the unauthorized 
declaration, China laid itself open to a diplomatic fiasco. Eager to escape the blame for the 
collapse of what had been billed as the most important conference of our lifetime, the North 
sanctimoniously pointed to China as the conference spoiler. At the same time, because of their 
partial participation in the side meetings, many developing countries’ negotiators and observers 
were confirmed in their suspicions that China had a self-serving agenda not consistent with that 
of the global South. After all, China joined the Obama caucuses and participated in the drafting 
of an unauthorized political declaration that the prominent Indian intellectual Praful Bidwai 
described as a “dirty collusive deal” between the US-led North and the China-led heavy polluters 
of the South. Despite Beijing’s point-by-point responses to such accusations, the general 
perception took hold that China was to blame for the failed talks. 
The Chinese leadership must find this billing as the villain of Copenhagen very 
frustrating. After all, right before Copenhagen, Beijing promised that it would reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product in 2020 by 40-45 percent compared to 2005 
levels. Its automobile fuel efficiency standards are now stricter than those of the United States. 
China now is a global leader in wind and solar energy development. Even Thomas Friedman, no 
lover of China, talks about China’s “Green Leap Forward” and how the government is 
determined to meet the energy challenge “with cleaner, homegrown sources so that its future 
economy will be less vulnerable to supply shocks and so it doesn’t pollute itself to death.”   
If any government sabotaged the meeting, it was the United States. U.S. negotiators made 
clear to the world even before Copenhagen that Washington was not yet ready for binding 
commitments after having evaded the emissions cuts required by the Kyoto Protocol for over a 
decade. Using U.S. Senate opposition as an excuse, Obama’s negotiators systematically 
dampened any hopes for the binding accord that the global public had expected Copenhagen 
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would produce. After being shamed by the pledges of other countries, Washington ultimately 
committed to a 17 percent voluntary cut of greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels, but other 
countries viewed Washington’s offer, which translated into an insignificant four percent 
reduction from 1990 levels, as a joke. 
Whether Obama and his negotiators were right in fearing a backlash from the right wing 
if they made the United States appear too ambitious is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, 
Washington’s diplomacy ensured that Copenhagen would be dead on arrival. It’s easy to imagine 
Beijing’s resentment at Obama’s push to engineer a public relations triumph via a declaration 
with high-sounding rhetoric laced with meaningless voluntary engagements and backed up with 
very little actual commitment. 
Although China was not the villain of Copenhagen, it did play the role of accomplice. It 
participated in Obama’s unofficial caucuses of the rich and the powerful even as it sought to lead 
the “G77 and China” grouping in the formal UN process. The conflicting demands of these two 
roles underline China’s contradictory status in the world: it is simultaneously an economic 
superpower with a massive carbon footprint and a developing country. Its economic and 
ecological impact on the world is now greater than most developed countries, but its leadership 
and people continue to see themselves as belonging to the developing world. 
In 2009, China displaced the United States as the world’s biggest automobile market and 
Germany as the world’s top exporter. China is expected to pass Japan as the world’s second 
biggest economy this year and overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest by 2030. So fast has 
China’s growth been in the last two decades that, as analyst Zachary Karabell notes, “as many as 
300 million people are middle class or upper middle class by any definition, and that number is 
equivalent to the population of the United States and of the European Union.” Yet hundreds of 
millions of rural Chinese are mired in poverty, earning an average of $400 a year. Moving up 
from poverty and hunger is their common aspiration, and Beijing fears that there will be hell to 
pay if this is thwarted. 
Making more and more of its population middle class in order to stave off political unrest 
is thus the Chinese leadership’s overriding goal. It can only accomplish this goal, in its view, by 
continuing on a high-growth path that is dependent, at least in the short term, on coal. China is 
now the world’s number one consumer of coal and its use now earns it the dubious honor of 
being the world’s number one emitter of greenhouse gases. As Richard Heinberg has noted, 
“while China is quickly becoming the world leader in renewable energy technologies, it has no 
realistic prospect of phasing out coal without giving up its high GDP growth rates.” 
China’s formal position leading up to Copenhagen was that the meeting should come up 
with a legally binding agreement committing the United States and other industrialized 
countries—which have contributed over 80 percent of the accumulated carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere—to deep cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions while limiting action demanded 
from developing countries like itself to voluntary targets. Yet so destabilizing is China’s coal-
dependent high-growth strategy that even if COP 15 had produced an agreement specifying 
mandatory cuts from the developed countries, the pressure on Beijing to agree to similar 
obligatory cuts would grow as it overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy and 
closed in on the United States; such a pressure would come not just from the North but the South 
as well. 
Thus the single-minded dedication to high-speed growth, which is the axis around which 
both its domestic and foreign policies spin, has motivated China to put off as long as possible the 
day when it will have to agree to mandatory limits on its greenhouse gas emissions. As such, the 
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weak, Obama-brokered accord that came out of Copenhagen and was mainly meant to 
accommodate the United States was also in sync with Beijing’s perceived interests. 
The planet, however, cannot wait. And the idea that one can deliver a U.S.-style middle-
class lifestyle for the bulk of the world’s population without provoking a climatic crisis is a 
dangerous illusion. Until it finally gets up the courage to turn away from the globally 
destabilizing high-growth, export-oriented development path pioneered by the North, Beijing 
will be condemned to play the role of Hamlet in global climate politics. As a developing country, 
it will continue to demand flexibility while covertly colluding to defuse tough climate measures 
that might obstruct its rise as an economic superpower. However, the world cannot afford this 
tragedy to be enacted on the global stage. 
I have spoken at length on the US-China relationship and on China’s development model 
because they are central issues in the climate debate. Now let me go to a related topic. 
The International Recession: Opportunities and Risks for Sustainable Development 
The question of China’s development model leads us to a discussion of the current state 
of the global economy as it relates to global warming. Between the end of 2008 and March 2010, 
we have seen the unraveling of a particular type of international economy of which China is a 
central part: one that is export-oriented and marked by the accelerated integration of production 
and markets. This globalized economy has been transportation-intensive, greatly dependent on 
ever-increasing long-distance transportation of goods. For instance, a plate of food consumed in 
the United States travels an average of 1,500 miles from source to table. Transportation, in turn, 
is fossil-fuel intensive, accounting in 2006 for 13% of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
and 23% of global carbon dioxide emissions. 
A downturn in the export-dependent global economy thus brings about a significant 
downturn in carbon emissions as well. It spells relief for the climate. In 2009, the drop in the 
level of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) has been the largest in the last 40 years. The thousands 
of ships marooned by lack of global demand in ports such as New York, Singapore, Rio de 
Janeiro, and Seoul means a significant reduction in the use of high-carbon Bunker C oil, which is 
used in 80% of ocean shipping. The cutback in airfreight has meant a significant reduction in the 
use of aviation fuel, which has been the fastest growing source of GHG emissions in recent 
years. 
In response to the collapse of the export-oriented global economy, many governments 
have fallen back on their domestic markets, revving them up via stimulus programs that put 
spending money in the hands of consumers. This move has been accompanied by a retreat from 
globalized production structures or “deglobalization.”  “The integration of the world economy is 
in retreat on almost every front,” writes the Economist. While the magazine says that 
corporations continue to believe in the efficiency of global supply chains, “like any chain, these 
are only as strong as their weakest link. A danger point will come if firms decide that this way of 
organizing production has had its day.” 
For many environmentalists and ecological economists in both the South and the North, 
the unraveling of the export-oriented global economy spells opportunity. It opens up the 
transition to more climate-friendly and ecologically sensitive ways of organizing economic life, 
beginning with making production and distribution less transportation intensive. It means 
opportunities for generating and promoting new approaches to development. However, instead of 
heralding this transition to much less fossil-fuel intensive and ecologically sustainable 
production, most technocrats and economists see only a temporary retreat from export-led 
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growth, only until global demand makes the latter viable. The preoccupation of economists and 
policymakers with the export engine to revive the global economy, which often excludes any 
concern about the negative impact of export-led globalization on the climate, was a dangerous 
divide leading up to Copenhagen. John Cavanagh, director of the Institute for Policy Studies, 
notes: “We have economic policymakers concerned with reversing recession and ecological 
economists concerned with strategic ways of reversing climate change talking past one another.” 
The policy debate in establishment circles focuses on who will replace the bankrupt 
American consumers as the engine of global demand. With Europe stagnant and Japan almost in 
permanent recession, the hope is that China's growth will be the basis of global reflation. Here is 
where the interests of the Chinese leadership and that of the global capitalist elite coincide, 
which is why speculations that China and the developed country elites are in collusion and not 
really interested in an effective climate treaty at this point is not without basis. 
  But this vision is a mirage. China's 8.9% annualized growth in the last quarter is due to 
their current stimulus, a $585 billion program that has been funneled mainly to the countryside. 
Domestic demand will likely cease to grow once the money is spent. A limited spurt of cash will 
not transform Chinese peasants into the saviors of the global economy. After all, because they 
bore the costs of the country's export-oriented economy, these peasants have seen their incomes 
and welfare severely erode over the last quarter of a century. 
The point, however, is that persisting illusions about global recovery make influential 
forces unwilling to take the opportunity to break with the fossil fuel-intensive globalization 
paradigm. Currently, the hope of the corporations is that the current export-oriented globalized 
world economy can be saved with China taking the lead in global recovery within a liberal global 
trading system revived by the completion of the Doha Round of negotiations of the World Trade 
Organization. 
This is not to say that there is no concern about climate change in these circles or that 
global business and technocratic circles are dominated by climate skeptics. Climate change is a 
major concern, but the dominant view is that this is a problem that can be resolved partly through 
techno-fixes such as biofuels, carbon sequestration and storage, a revival of nuclear power, and 
partly through market mechanisms such as carbon trading. Obama’s Energy Secretary Steven 
Chu is a champion of nuclear power, and the farthest Washington’s liberals are willing to go in 
terms of serious efforts to confront global warming is a cap-and-trade system. Carbon taxes and 
tougher state regulation are non-negotiable. 
It is tragic that even such minimal measures as carbon taxes have been seen as politically 
impossible by liberal circles, for meeting the challenge of climate change demands a more 
fundamental transformation, a point I will return to later. 
Implications for an Interdisciplinary Approach 
 Let me then move on to discuss some of the implications of the foregoing discussion of 
key issues in climate politics on the interdisciplinary approach. In his review of the influential 
Stern Report on climate change policy, Anthony Giddens says, “Extraordinarily, there is no 
mention of politics in Stern’s discussion, no analysis of power, or of the tense nature of 
international relations.” I think this can be said of so many accounts of climate policy by 
economists, environmentalists, and environmental journalists.   
Many of the accounts of the Copenhagen meeting were made without an understanding 
of the context of the North-South dynamics that are familiar to students of international relations 
and international political economy. The clash on the climate is the latest in a series of 
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confrontations that took place in aid policy and in trade policy that pitted the North against the 
South. On the question of assistance, the South in the late fifties proposed the Special United 
Nations Fund for Development (SUNFED) and the North countered with the International 
Development Association window of the World Bank, which the North already controlled. On 
international trade, the South lined up behind the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development while the North pushed and eventually imposed the WTO. Without the knowledge 
of the North-South conflicts in these areas, where the North was able to impose its will, 
economists and environmentalists alike will not be able to understand the depth of frustration, 
anger, and suspicion that developing countries like China bring to the climate change 
negotiations.   
The informal caucuses of selected countries pushed by the U.S. and Danish governments 
reminded Southern participants of the exclusive Green Room discussions in the WTO 
negotiations and were the central factor that torpedoed the Copenhagen meetings. An 
interdisciplinary approach, informed particularly by a grasp of international relations and 
international political economy, would have sensitized analysts to these dimensions and avoided 
the flawed superficial analyses scapegoating China for the Copenhagen debacle. 
 An interdisciplinary approach would also help us understand China’s dilemma. The 
realist paradigm in international relations would not be sufficient to gain a full understanding of 
China’s climate policies. This is not simply a case of a rising hegemon’s response to the efforts 
of status quo powers to impose constraints on its ascent within the international system. A 
political economy and sociological approach would locate much of China’s behavior in domestic 
factors, that is, in a desperate effort by a ruling elite to maintain legitimacy by reproducing and 
intensifying a model of economic growth based on expanding consumption that it inherited from 
the North. 
 Finally, an interdisciplinary approach would be critical in helping us understand that 
meeting the challenge of climate change would involve more than a shift from fossil fuel to other 
energy sources and that techno-fixes such as biofuels, nuclear technology, carbon sequestration 
and storage, and carbon trading are not sufficient. The dependence on fossil fuels, first on coal, 
then on oil, has been intimately related to the rise of a certain mode of production and 
organization: capitalism. Driven by the search for profit, capitalism has commodified man’s 
relations with man [sic], and man’s relations with nature. Capitalism’s incessant drive is to 
transform living nature into dead commodities, with tremendous waste being created in the 
process. This dynamic has accelerated in recent decades with the decimation of the state as a 
force constraining capital’s drive during the era of neoliberalism. 
To put capital at the center of analysis means harnessing the analytical resources of all 
the disciplines to help deconstruct the climate crisis. Capital is power, which means we must call 
on the science that deals with politics. Capital is a relationship among classes, both at the 
national and international level, and this makes imperative the role of sociological analysis.  
Capital involves institutions that organize production, distribution, and consumption, which 
means calling on the resources of institutional economics. As for neoliberal economics, with its 
theoretical and normative fixation on the market, I am afraid it is more of a hindrance than a 
guide to understanding the climate crisis and solutions to it. 
An interdisciplinary, holistic approach pushes us to think outside the box, outside the 
techno-fixes and social-fixes that continue to frame the international response to global warming. 
The climate challenge is essentially a challenge for us to make the economy transition from 
being driven fundamentally by overproduction and overconsumption to being geared to meeting 
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real needs, marked by moderate or low consumption, and based on sustainable and decentralized 
production. But is this possible without a more fundamental transformation? Let me be more 
specific by posing a question: Even if the international community were able to successfully 
negotiate a regime of mandatory cuts and even if it were able to create a viable adaptation fund 
that would channel a significant volume of funds to developing countries to cope with global 
warming, would such a regime be sustainable in the long run without strong restraints on the 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, indeed without a fundamental transformation 
of our mode of organizing production?   
And on that controversial question to which there are no easy answers, let me end by 
thanking all of you for being such an attentive audience. 
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